ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF RURAL POLICING: The impact of closing the Commandos by Steinberg, Jonny
In February 2003, President Thabo Mbekiannounced that the South African DefenceForce’s Territorial Reserve, popularly known as
the Commandos, would be phased out. This phasing
out process is now well underway. By the end of
2009, the last of South Africa’s 183 Commandos will
have ceased operating, their rural crime prevention
and borderline control functions taken over by the
South African Police Service (SAPS).
The announcement that the Commandos are to be
phased out has elicited a great deal of controversy.
This is hardly surprising. Any debate about the
Commandos must inevitably find itself tackling the
charged and difficult question of the relationship
between security and race. At one end of the
spectrum, government has been accused of leaving
isolated white families of the agricultural hinterland
vulnerable to violent crime. At the other, it has been
lauded for closing down a quasi-private militia
sensitive to white farmers’ security but insensitive to
black citizens’ rights.
Background to the Commandos
The Commandos have in fact occupied an awkward
and ambivalent position in government thinking
ever since 1994. From the inception of the South
African Defence Force in the 1960s, assisting the
police with day-to-day policing was never meant to
be a central function of the Commandos. The
Commandos’ primary function was then, and
remains now, one of rear area defence during
wartime. Rear area defence consists in securing
military communication and supply lines, guarding
strategic civilian infrastructure such as power
stations, national key points such airports and
broadcasting infrastructure, and protecting civilian
life from enemy hostility in rural South Africa. The
rationale is to free up permanent forces for frontline
warfare. 
The most prominent secondary function conceived
for the Commandos was that of assisting state
departments in times of crisis, be the crisis drought
or floods, civil disorder, or the outbreak of an
epidemic. Commandos’ involvement in policing
really escalated as a matter of circumstance – the
circumstance being the internal insurgency against
apartheid which began in June 1976 and never
really ended until the demise of the old order. The
policing with which Commandos were involved
was blunt, aggressive and paramilitary. A veteran
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Implicit in President Mbeki’s controversial announcement in February 2003 that the Commandos are to be
phased out is a statement that the SAPS is now strong enough to police rural South Africa on its own, and that
the uncomfortable, transitional role the military has been playing in this area can come to an end. The key
question posed in a recent ISS study was whether rural policing would be strengthened or weakened by the
decision. The research suggests that closing the Commandos will weaken rural policing but strengthen the
policing of contact crimes in rural towns.
Commando member interviewed for this study in
Johannesburg’s West Rand recalled participating in
an “internal security operation” in the township of
Khutsong. He told us that:
We literally used to close the entire township
down. Hundreds of soldiers and riot police
would cordon off the whole township and
we would search every room of every house
and every shack in every street. The
operation would take maybe four or five
hours. By the end of it, we had between us
seen every article of underwear in the
township, every Sunday dress, every kitchen
ladle.
It is hardly surprising that when the African National
Congress came to power in 1994 it felt strongly that
the role of the SANDF in ordinary policing should
cease. The 1996 Defence White Paper made it clear
that it was “a matter of urgency that plans are
formulated to allow for the withdrawal of the
SANDF from a policing role.”1
Realities on the ground during the mid-1990s,
however, mitigated against the removal of the
Commandos from policing functions. While South
Africa’s new police force, the SAPS, was getting its
house in order, the crime rate remained high. Crime
in rural areas took on inflammatory political
meanings. Violent crimes against farmers were
dubbed ‘farm attacks’, a heavily loaded term which
suggested a blurring of the lines between criminal
aggression and guerrilla activity, and between
acquisitiveness and political revenge. 
Faced with high levels of violent crime which had
been sharply politicised, and a police force
distracted by the tasks of consolidation, the
withdrawal of the crime fighting capacity from rural
areas contained in the Commandos was deemed
extremely unwise.
Thus, the Commandos occupied this ambivalent no-
man’s-land role for the first ten years of democracy.
President Mbeki’s February 2003 announcement
that the Commandos were to be phased out is an
implicit statement that the SAPS is now strong
enough to police rural South Africa on its own, that
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the uncomfortable, transitional role the military has
been playing in the policing of rural South Africa can
come to an end.
The task of a recent research project conducted for
the Institute for Security Studies, the findings of which
are summarised in this article, was to determine
whether President Mbeki is right. Our task was to
assess the rural safety capacity that will be lost with
the closing of the Commandos, and to discuss the
manner in which the SAPS will replace that capacity.
The ultimate question we posed was whether rural
policing would be strengthened or weakened by the
closure of the Commandos.2
Composition and functions of the Commandos
The early 1990s was a period of weakening and
decline for the Commandos. They haemorrhaged
personnel copiously, partly because of the end of
conscription, partly because many veteran members
refused to work for the military under an ANC
government. They also began to suffer under steady
and incremental budget cuts, as South Africa’s
military spending in general began to decline. 
Beginning in 1996, the Territorial Reserve was given a
budget to recruit aggressively in the black townships
of rural South Africa. The vast majority of the new
recruits were unemployed and joined in order to earn
a living. Following a period of basic training, an entry
level recruit earns R114.00 per day (in 2005 prices)
and can work for up to 180 days per year. An entry
level Territorial Reserve member can thus earn in the
region of R20,000 per year, no mean sum in the
context of a rural South African township. 
As far as recruitment criteria are concerned, recruits
must be South African citizens, must not have a
criminal record, and should have a matric school
qualification. However, a large number of recruits
with a Standard Eight education have also been
accepted into the Territorial Reserve over the last
decade.
The Territorial Reserve thus changed dramatically in a
very short space of time. In 1990, it was the
institution into which hundreds of thousands of white
South African men were periodically mobilised for
military service. Its manifest presence was that of an
auxiliary force in the maintenance of public order
and social and political control. By 1996, it was a
very different beast. White membership had
dwindled considerably – in some areas to little as a
few dozen. Black membership grew exponentially
as the Territorial Reserve became a de facto
employment provider and skills developer in rural
towns across the country. At present, between
12,000 and 15,000 people are solely dependent on
Commando work for their income.3
The Commandos of today bear the hallmarks of this
legacy. Each Commando hosts two types of
structures: area bound units and non-area bound
units. Generally – although there are obviously
many exceptions – white members of the
Commando are full participants in the civilian
economy and thus give comparatively little of their
time to Commando work. They are generally active
in area bound units. These units have two functions: 
• gathering of information and intelligence, which 
gets relayed to joint, interdepartmental security
planning structures; and 
• an area bound rapid response capacity, in essence 
a mutual assistance function for neighbours,
particularly rapid response in a time of
emergency. 
The demands on the time of a member of an area
bound unit are small. To remain active and retain
his entitlement to keep an army-issue assault rifle at
his home, a member must report quarterly for
weapons training and must submit to annual
inspections which ensure that his weapon is
properly stored and in good working order.
The second type of unit present in each Commando
is the non-area bound unit, also known as the
reaction unit. These are largely – again, not entirely
– staffed by black members recruited in the mid and
late 1990s. Most wish to maximise the amount of
time they spend on duty, for they are breadwinners
whose primary or sole source of income is
Commando work. 
Non-area bound units are not permitted to work
independently of the police. They are strictly an
auxiliary force, assisting in intelligence-driven crime
prevention SAPS operations. They are, in short, a
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force multiplier, one with limited powers and
capacities. Below is a list of the types of operations
non-area bound units are permitted to join, and,
where necessary, a brief description of their
operation-specific role:
• observation posts (Commando members do not 
have powers of apprehension or arrest.
Observation posts should be led by SAPS
members);
• listening posts;
• roadblocks (Commando members’ function is to 
secure the roadblock; they do not have powers to
search vehicles or to approach members of the
public and they are also not permitted to open
fire on vehicles which fail to stop at roadblocks);
• vehicle check points;
• vehicle and foot patrols (again, SANDF soldiers 
do not have powers of apprehension or arrest and
patrols should be led by police officials);
• cordon-and-search operations (SANDF soldiers 
have the powers to cordon, but not to search).
To give a sense of the scale of the Commandos and
the operations in which they are involved, at the
end of March 2004 total Commando strength was
43,976, of which 17,957 was utilised and 26,019
was dormant. Between the beginning of April 2004
and the end of March 2005, Commando members
were involved in 79,004 operations. The vast
majority of these were farm visits (29,351) and
vehicle patrols (24,242). Commando members were
also present at more at 9,072 foot patrols, 4,207
roadblocks, 2,926 vehicle check points, 2,995
observation posts, 4,907 cordon-and-search
operations, 16 air support operations, 46
motorcycle patrols and 49 equestrian patrols.4
As can be seen from the description of their
functions above, the non-area bound units are
pretty blunt policing instruments. Equipped with
very restricted policing powers and highly
circumscribed functions, they are little more than
feet on the ground, or force multipliers. Their job is
really that of a kind of security guard – defending
the agricultural property – and increasing security
force visibility in rural areas.
In our experience, though, SAPS station
commissioners were delighted, in some cases
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relieved, to have them. The typical rural policing
jurisdiction in South Africa includes a rural town at
its centre – replete with suburbs, townships, and
informal settlements – and a vast expanse of
farmland stretching to its periphery. 
The vast majority of reported crimes – from burglary,
to robbery, to assault – occur in town centres, and
that is where station commissioners invest the
greater part of their personnel and infrastructure.
Station commissioners are thus only too delighted to
have a steady and reliable source of force
multipliers to assist in the policing of the rural
districts of their jurisdictions. Indeed, in two of the
three areas we visited, farmers had come to rely far
more on the Commandos than police for their
primary policing services. 
Do Commandos represent rural SA?
Although the research suggests that Commandos do
not represent the rural population of the country,
this finding is less controversial than may appear at
first sight. 
Typical Commando operations are aimed at
preventing crimes against the people, property and
businesses of the rural middle class. Does this make
the Commando a problematic structure? Political
orthodoxy tells us that all public security structures
must represent everybody’s interests, that the
Commandos, for instance, must include everybody.
But is that goal possible? 
Rural South African communities are deeply divided
– by race, by inequality, and by a great deal of
history. Asking a public security structure – whether
a Commando or the SAPS – to bridge these divides,
is perhaps asking too much. It is asking a structure
tasked with defending people and property to mend
souls; a structure with limited means and blunt
instruments to conduct social engineering. Public
security organs must, of course, be given mandates
which are fair. And everybody must be given the
policing service they require. But that is a very
different point.
However, when the capacity contained in the
Commandos is used injudiciously, they can indeed
cause a great deal of harm. When every gathering of
black people around a crate of beer is deemed to be
a hotspot; when every rural drinking establishment
in the countryside is deemed a potential source of
crime; when every rural settlement is regarded as a
hideout for criminals, Commandos begin to
aggravate racial tensions and to do their jobs
inequitably. That is when they begin to police the
property of one constituency by invading the privacy
and violating the dignity of another. 
Commandos ought to do ‘hotspot policing’ – putting
uniformed bodies in places where crime is known to
occur. But the sort of hotspot policing at which they
are best is largely passive. Their job is not to scour
the countryside for weapons and potential criminals. 
Rural policing without the Commandos
Despite many hiccups, at the time of writing it
appears that the SAPS will successfully replace the
capacity that will be lost with the closure of the
Commandos. The SAPS has set aside a budget to
recruit and remunerate an annually escalating
number of reservists beginning in the current
financial year until 2009. Many of these reservists
will hopefully be recruited directly from the ranks of
the Commandos. 
For the 2005/06 financial year, funds have been set
aside to call up 2,000 reservists for a maximum of
seven days per month for active duty. This figure will
rise incrementally until by 2009/10 20,000 reservists
will be called up for a maximum of seven days per
month. At the rank of Inspector, reservists will be
paid R126.99 per day of active duty at 2005 prices.5
If one assumes that 12,000 part-time soldiers
currently earn a living in the Commandos, and that
they work an average of 120 days per year, their
collective manpower totals 1.44 million working
days per year. If, by 2009, the SAPS deploys 20,000
reservists on active duty for seven days each month,
collective manpower will total 1.68 million working
days per year. 
By this narrow and limited measure, a total gain of
14% of annual working days would have been
achieved by the time the last Commando closes its
doors in 2009.6 The issue that remains is how the
SAPS will fashion and deploy this capacity.
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Rural towns vs. the agricultural hinterland
It is our contention that the SAPS will, over time,
shift increasing proportions of the capacity it inherits
from the Commandos from the rural districts and
into the town centres of rural policing jurisdictions.
The closure of the Commandos will thus result in
the weakening of rural policing but in the
strengthening of the policing of contact crimes in
rural town centres.
All police services exercise discretion in deciding
which aspects of policing to prioritise. In the SAPS,
this discretion is exercised primarily at a national
level. Area and station level managers are given
quantifiable crime reduction and police action
targets to meet. At present, the highest priority
crimes in the SAPS are contact crimes, and are
attached to an annual crime reduction target of
seven percent. This is a normative, value-laden
decision, and a commendable one at that. 
In small town police stations, however, the policing
of rural sectors will suffer as a result. Many of these
stations straddle a sharp divide between urban and
rural areas. Most contact crimes are committed in
urban sectors. If and when the capacity contained in
the Commandos is transferred to the police, area
and station level managers are bound to transfer
much of this capacity from the rural sectors in
which it is now deployed to urban sectors. Not to
do so would be to respond irrationally to their own
performance indicators; they must do so in an
attempt to meet their targets.
In making this argument, we are not necessarily
criticising the police. We acknowledge that deciding
how to distribute policing resources is a difficult
matter and that the decisions the SAPS has made in
this regard are entirely defendable. Prioritising the
policing of, say, aggravated robbery over sheep theft
is not just understandable but commendable. The
SAPS should be aware though that there are places
where its existing organisational incentives might,
unless checked, result in situations where
agricultural crimes are almost entirely unpoliced. 
The SAPS should also consider that the station
commissioners who inherit the capacity currently
contained in the Commandos will be placed in an
invidious position. On the one hand, a very vocal
and vociferous local constituency – commercial
farmers – will protest that existing capacity be left
where it is at very least; strengthened at best. They
will demand better service. 
Indeed, by establishing Crime Sector Forums in
rural sectors, the SAPS is encouraging that such
demands be made. Yet pressure exerted on the
station commissioner from within the SAPS, in the
form of performance targets, will be to feed the
urban sectors at the price of rural sectors. The
station commissioner will find himself wedged
between the demands of a grassroots constituency
and the priorities established nationally.
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Endnotes
1 South African White Paper on Defence, Chapter 4, 
paragraph 33, 1996, at <http://www.mil.za/Articles&
Papers/Frame/Frame.htm>.
2 After their closure, the Commandos’ non-policing 
functions – namely, wartime rear area defence and
peacetime assistance in “exceptional circumstances” –
will become the responsibility of the permanent force.
Assessing the SANDF’s capacity to perform these
functions after the closure of the Commandos was
beyond the remit of our research.
3 Author’s correspondence with Major General JF Lusse, 
co-chairman, National Joints Task Team, 2 August 2005.
4 Ibid.
5 Author’s communication with SAPS Assistant 
Commissioner Ben Groenewald, 26 July 2005.
6 Individual Commando members who are recruited into 
the police reserve will not, however, gain a 14%
increase in income. On the contrary, they will lose
income. Currently, an entry-level recruit in the
Commandos (the equivalent to a police corporal) who
works 120 days per year at R144 per day earns
R13,680 per year. Under the police reserve
dispensation, a middle-ranking inspector, working his
maximum of 84 days per year, will earn R10,667 per
annum. Commando members who join the police
reserve, and rely solely on their SAPS work for their
livelihoods, will in general experience a steep decline
in income.
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